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  In this study, both the proximate causes and underlying theory of the military 
crimes of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) are found to differ from those seen 
within the conventional U.S. military. Conventional military crimes tend to be 
dispositional, where the personality of the individual is more at play as opposed to 
situational factors. In contrast, SOF crimes are better described by a situationist model in 
which situational factors, primarily SOF culture, are more to blame than the individual. 
Military crimes, defined as actions committed by deployed U.S. service members that are 
in violation of the UCMJ and associated with one’s professional duties or in violation of 
the Law of Armed Conflict, are detrimental to U.S. national security and the overall 
efficacy of the U.S. military. They can act as a spoiling attack for peace talks, provoke 
reprisal attacks by the enemy, and reduce the prestige of the armed forces in the eyes of 
the U.S. population and the world at large. In recent years, U.S. military strategy has 
relied increasingly on the use of SOF rather than conventional military forces, raising the 
status of the SOF organization and the potential repercussions of their military crimes.  
 Using a Grounded Theory research methodology to analyze a collection of crimes 
within the two organizations, four proximate causes for conventional military crimes are 
discovered, along with three proximate causes for SOF crimes. These causes are 
significantly different, although one cause is shared between the groups: personal greed. 
The differences are due to the unique SOF selection, training, and education processes, as 
well as a SOF culture that has excessively valued combat in the post-9/11 years at the 
expense of leadership, discipline, and ethical decision making.  
Research Study Advisor: Professor Sarah Clark 
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 1 
Introduction  
 This research finds that the military crimes of U.S. Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) differ significantly from those of the conventional1 U.S. military in terms of 1) the 
proximate causes of individual crimes and 2) the theory that best explains the root causes 
of each organization’s crimes as a whole. The proximate causes of SOF military crimes 
are Pushing Boundaries, Excessive Individual Action, and Personal Greed. In contrast, 
the proximate causes found for conventional forces’ crimes are Violent Desire Unrelated 
to Combat, Over Aggression Related to Combat, Personal Greed, and Systemic Disregard 
for Human Rights. These differing proximate causes suggest that the root causes of the 
organizations’ military crimes are significantly different as well. The root cause of 
conventional forces’ crimes is best explained by the dispositional theory, meaning that 
the individual is most to blame. SOF crimes, in contrast, are better explained by the 
situationist theory, where the surrounding features of the situation—in this case, 
primarily the SOF culture—are more to blame than the individual. These differences 
between the two organizations are due to what this study refers to as the “SOF Process” 
and the unique SOF culture. 
The question at the heart of this research is “do the military crimes committed by 
U.S. SOF personnel differ from those committed by U.S. conventional military 
personnel? If so, how?” To answer these questions, this study follows a grounded theory 
qualitative research approach using constant comparative analysis to analyze the military 
crimes committed by the two organizations, determine the proximate cause of each 
 
1 This study defines conventional forces as all members of the U.S. military not in Special Operations 
Forces. However, the preponderance of criminal data available and used within the study are those of land-
based forces of the U.S. Army, Marines, and Navy. 
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military crime, and ultimately develop a theory grounded in this data. The constant 
comparative analysis process involves identifying a phenomenon, identifying key 
concepts within that phenomenon, deciding how to categorize that data as the analysis 
takes place, and finally following a three-step coding process to create a theory from that 
data. This theory, outlined in the preceding paragraph and later discussed in depth, is 
substantive in nature and provides a framework for U.S. military decision makers and 
leaders to mitigate the national security risks associated with military crime. 
 Man—as both an academic and a battlefield practitioner— has been dogged by 
questions surrounding morality and proper conduct in warfare for thousands of years. 
Cicero famously said that “in times of war, the law falls silent,”2 highlighting the inherent 
hypocrisy between the rule of law intended to protect society and the state-sponsored 
mass murder of war. Despite this paradox, mankind has worked diligently in recent 
centuries to create and enforce a code of legal conduct in war. In the U.S., this code is 
referred to as the Law of Armed Conflict, or LOAC, and is delineated in a Department of 
Defense Publication entitled the Law of War Manual.3 However, condensing the topic 
into a single publication obscures the complexity of the subject because the LOAC is not 
one clear set of laws; rather, it is an array of laws, regulations, and norms laid out by a 
series of international agreements landmarked by the Hague and Geneva Conventions, 
and it is continuously changing over time.4 The LOAC is confounded not only by the 
 
2 Paul MacKendrick, The Speeches of Cicero (London: Duckworth, 1995). 
3U.S. Department of Defense, “Law of War Manual,” Office of General Counsel, Department of Defense 
(December 2016),  
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD%20Law%20of%20War%20Manual%20-
%20June%202015%20Updated%20Dec%202016.pdf?ver=2016-12-13-172036-190. 
4 Department of Defense, “Law of War Manual.” 
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changing character of warfare but also the changing nature of military forces themselves, 
such as the development of elite units known as SOF. 
 Governments and militaries around the globe have increasingly grown and relied 
upon these special operations personnel since the end of World War II. These forces are 
more experienced than their conventional force counterparts, being specially selected, 
trained, and educated to conduct the most dangerous and secretive operations on their 
nation’s behalf; they are considered among the most elite and precious military resources 
that a nation can utilize to address a national security problem.  
In the 21st century, no nation’s special operations units have been more prolific 
than those of the United States. However, those same units have recently been “mired in 
scandal.”5 U.S. SOF units—including U.S. Army Special Forces (Green Berets), Navy 
SEALs, and Marine Corps Special Operations Command (MARSOC) Raiders—
famously conducted the post-9/11 mission to topple the Taliban, the raids to kill Osama 
bin Laden and the Islamic State leader Abu bakr Al-Baghdadi, and the preponderance of 
combat operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Unfortunately, in recent 
years, these elite U.S. forces have become progressively known for their breaches of 
ethical and legal conduct as much as their successful exploits on the battlefield.6 As U.S. 
military strategy continues to shift towards one that is more SOF-centric,7 the 
repercussions of SOF military crimes will continue to grow and threaten U.S. military 
 
5 Meghann Myers, “Spec Ops in Trouble: Mired in Scandal and under Pentagon Review, What Will It Take 
to Clean House?,” Military Times (March 13, 2019), https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-
army/2019/03/13/spec-ops-in-trouble-mired-in-scandal-and-under-pentagon-review-what-will-it-take-to-
clean-house/. 
6 Myers, “Spec Ops in Trouble.” 
7 Daniel Byman and Ian Merritt, “The New American Way of War: Special Operations Forces in the War 
on Terrorism,” The Washington Quarterly 41, no. 2 (July 5, 2018). 
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strategy, as well as the long-term viability of the SOF units so heavily relied upon in 
recent years. 
Military Crimes and National Security: A Self-Inflicted Spoiling Attack 
 The study and prevention of military crimes is significant for national security 
because such crimes can—and often do—act as a type of self-inflicted “spoiling attack” 
at the strategic level. In the military, a spoiling attack is used by one force to impair or 
inhibit an opposing force in the planning or preparation phase or to affect the progress of 
negotiations. In an insurgency, for example, a more militant wing of the rebellion—less 
open to negotiation or a political solution to the conflict—may conduct a materially 
destructive and lethal spoiling attack in a city center to slow or even halt the peace 
process. The goals of the attack are far greater than simply the loss of life or destruction 
of the city. The psychological and political repercussions can cease high-level strategic 
communication between the two sides of the conflict and extend the bloodshed 
indefinitely. Similarly, military crimes function as self-inflicted spoiling attacks by 
damaging strategic level peace talks, inspiring enemy reprisal, and damaging the prestige 
of the armed forces.  
 U.S. military crimes, particularly those of atrocious or inflammatory natures, can 
function as self-inflicted spoiling attacks in three ways. First, on multiple occasions in the 
post-9/11 War on Terror, military crimes committed by U.S. personnel have slowed or 
halted ongoing peace negotiations conducted at the highest levels of the U.S. 
government.8 Second, they can catalyze enemy reaction and provide the enemy not only 
 
8 David Alexander, “Taliban Threatens Revenge as Alleged Afghan Massacre Soldier Robert Bales 




motivation and resolve but also valuable propaganda to undermine the legitimacy of U.S. 
operations.9 Third, military crimes undermine the trust that both the U.S. and world 
populations have in the U.S. military, reducing the efficacy of the armed forces and the 
likelihood of their use in future situations where they may be needed. To mitigate and 
reduce these risks, the U.S. must reduce the occurrence of military crimes. To do so, 
however, it is necessary to understand their circumstances and the nature of the forces 
likely to commit them. 
What are Military Crimes? A Definition 
 For the purposes of this research, “military crimes” are defined as criminal (or 
allegedly criminal) actions conducted by uniformed U.S. military personnel while 
deployed outside of the U.S. that are either 1) in violation of the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (UCMJ) AND significantly associated with one’s professional military 
duties abroad or 2) in violation of any of the various international agreements defining 
and limiting the conduct of armed conflict, broadly known as the LOAC. The first 
category includes crimes that are not traditional “war crimes” and that could not have 
been conducted without the scope of one’s professional duties offering unique 
opportunity—that is, either the perpetrator’s military role provides special access or the 
crime is directly related to one’s military job. For example, a drunken assault by a U.S. 
service member on another U.S. service member over a gambling debt on a secure 
military base abroad would not qualify; although it is in violation of the UCMJ and 
occurred abroad, the crime is not associated with the perpetrator’s professional duties. 
Thus, it is a simple crime and not a military crime. In contrast, the theft of U.S. funds that 
 
9 Alexander, “Taliban Threatens Revenge.” 
 6 
one has special access to as a part of their military duties while deployed would be 
considered a military crime because it involves one’s professional privileges—the access 
to special funds—and is in violation of the UCMJ. The second category in the definition 
includes traditional “war crimes” in violation of the LOAC; these include crimes such as 
the illegal killing of enemy combatants or civilians, the rape of foreign nationals in 
wartime, the desecration of enemy bodies, or the taking of illegal war trophies.  
 This research eschews the more commonly used “war crimes” for two reasons. 
First, the term “war crimes” is cumbersome, as evidenced by the U.S. Law of War 
manual, which itself acknowledges different and competing definitions of the term10; it is 
also connotatively charged, which adds to the significantly cumbersome nature of its use. 
Second, such violations of the Law of Armed Conflict unnecessarily limit the types of 
crimes to be researched. By also including violations of the UCMJ that are strongly 
associated with professional military duties abroad, a clearer picture of the breaches of 
professional conduct within the profession of arms can be drawn. It is these breaches that 
this research intends to explore. For example, if the more restrictive “war crimes” was 
used, it would not allow the inclusion of military crimes conducted in Africa or South 
America because they are not declared theatres of armed conflict—or “war zones”—and 
may or may not involve the crimes outlined in the LOAC. The more inclusive “military 





10 Department of Defense, “Law of War Manual,” 163. 
 7 
Literature Review: Two Theories of Military Crime and the Nature of SOF 
Introduction  
 A review of the academic literature that informed this research will follow in 
three parts. First, an examination of the prominent theories regarding why any service 
member—not just those in elite units—may commit military crimes will broadly frame 
the research. Second, an analysis of the differences between SOF and conventional 
forces—as well as what makes the former unique in contrast to the latter—will highlight 
why it is reasonable to expect the two groups to differ in their military crimes. Together, 
these two sections will inform the research by engaging with the leading theories 
surrounding military crime and explaining why it is reasonable to expect the crimes of the 
two organizations to differ. Finally, an explanation of two identified gaps in the available 
research will explain a deficiency in the literature and place this study within the context 
of the scholarship as a whole.  
 This research is one of pragmatic social science, not psychology. Although much 
of the research in the field is from psychologists seeking to understand the psychological 
foundations and “true” causes of military crimes, this is neither the goal of this research 
nor the academic field of this author. Rather, a substantive social science approach is 
used—informed by the psychological literature—to compare the nature and facts of the 






Literature Review Part I: Theories on Military Crime 
Literature Review Part Ia: Situationist Theory  
 The first of two primary theories that seek to explain why soldiers commit 
military crimes is the “situationist theory.” This theory centers on situational factors such 
as unit culture, combat stress, military training, the peculiarities of warfare, and pressure 
from peers and superiors to explain why military personnel break the law. A number of 
prominent psychologists and sociologists suggest that these factors, in contrast to more 
individual factors such as personality or character, exert greater influence over a service 
member’s criminal behavior than is commonly assumed.11 An important implication of 
this theory is that in general, modern Western understandings of character are inherently 
flawed because they do not acknowledge the significant extent to which an environment 
shapes one’s actions.12 Philosophers, social scientists, and psychologists who share this 
view argue that it heightens the effects of factors commonly considered to be “in the 
background”—such as organizational culture and the peculiarities of military training—
to a position of primacy that explains the motivations for criminal behavior in the 
military.13 
 These authors suggest that there are two primary factors associated with being a 
military member that are essential to understanding military crimes. The first is the 
psychological effects that combat and killing have on the human brain and character. The 
second—and more broadly applicable—factor involves the repercussions of ‘distal’ 
 
11 Matthew Talbert and Jessica Wolfendale, War Crimes: Causes, Excuses, and Blame (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2019). 
12 John Doris, Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge, 2002) 
13 Talbert and Wolfendale, War Crimes. 
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pressures on the service member.14 Distal pressures include both military training and 
military culture and are much more broadly relevant than the effects of combat stress; this 
is because while relatively few service members in modern conflicts actually kill an 
enemy, every service member experiences distal pressures.15 Situationist scholars also 
believe that the obedience to authority and psychological conditioning that are instilled in 
service members through training and repetition hinder their ability to say no to illegal 
orders or even to appropriately analyze orders that might be illegal.16 In short, proponents 
of this theory argue that the unique pressures of military service, culture, and combat 
affect a service member to such a degree that the service member cannot be reasonably 
held accountable for their moral judgements and decisions.17 
 The situationist theory offers a compelling argument with sound evidence and 
does well to explain why otherwise law-abiding members of society may commit military 
crimes when removed from their civilian lives and placed in a far-flung battlefield. 
However, competing theorists contend that the situationist explanation begs two related 
questions that that are not sufficiently answered and that ultimately reduce the theory’s 
credibility. The first question, often dubbed the “smile problem,” inquires why some 
service members who commit military crimes seem to enjoy it—or “smile”—while 
others seem repulsed by their crimes.18 The second, and perhaps more challenging, 
question for the situationist theory is if the situational pressures of combat and military 
service are so severe as to cause military crimes for which the perpetrators are not 
 
14 John Doris and Dominic Murphy, “From My Lai to Abu Ghraib: The Moral Psychology of 
Atrocity,” Midwest Studies in Psychology 31, no. 1 (2007): 25-55. 
15 Doris and Murphy, “From My Lai to Abu Ghraib.” 
16 Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society, 3rd ed. 
(New York, NY: Back Bay Books, 2009). 
17 Talbert and Wolfendale, War Crimes, 37. 
18 Talbert and Wolfendale, War Crimes. 
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entirely to blame, then why do the majority of those who serve not commit military 
crimes?19 Situationist authors struggle to square these questions with their theory. 
Dispositional theorists offer another critique of situationists aimed at the universal 
applicability of the theory. If the situational stressors of military service absolve one of 
moral blame, as the theory contends, do pressures in civilian life also absolve citizens of 
wrongdoing? Violence, death, distal pressures, and cultural bounds towards obedience 
are not solely domains of the military. If these factors absolve service members of moral 
and legal blame, then they can just as easily absolve every civilian criminal who has 
experienced similar pressures, according to dispositional authors.  
Literature Review Part Ib: Dispositional Theory  
 In contrast to the situationist theory, proponents of the dispositional theory look to 
include a service member’s self-perception, personal goals, and individual values to 
explain their military crimes. These authors argue that one’s own character is of equal or 
greater importance compared to their environment to explain acts of military crime. 
Although these scholars do not dispute that many situational pressures can and do affect 
service members, they largely reject the situationist conclusions on two grounds.  
First, they contend that the situationist account falls short by not explaining the 
weight that political and social schemas have upon a service member’s ability to 
understand military events.20 In other words, these authors mean that social constructs of 
abstract concepts that surround military crimes—for instance, “moral justice,” “respect 
for persons,” and “torture”—are taught by society long before military service and are 
 
19 Talbert and Wolfendale, War Crimes. 
20 Talbert and Wolfendale, War Crimes, 56. 
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ingrained in one’s character, not created as a result of military-specific distal pressures.21 
This fact, dispositional authors argue, explains why some perpetrators of military crimes 
seem to almost paradoxically believe that their actions were ethically and legally sound 
despite their atrocious nature.22 
Second, dispositional theorists argue that their theory accounts for the human 
agency of service members, as well as their personal belief systems.23 In contrast to the 
situationist theory, dispositional authors offer that these factors provide a more complete 
and well-argued explanation for military crimes. Additionally, the dispositional theory 
addresses the two problems left unanswered by the situationist theory. By explaining 
criminal motivations through a complex web of internal personality and external 
situational stressors, these theorists explain how one criminal actor may “smile” while 
another may grimace when engaged in the same criminal act. Furthermore, because this 
theory accounts for a wider array of individual factors, such as belief systems and 
upbringing, it can more accurately explain why some service members commit military 
crimes while many do not under the same situational pressures. 
 Ultimately, both theories have merit, and one should not be excluded in favor of 
the other. Rather, they should be seen as two parts of a whole that work together to 
explain military crime. In some situations, the first theory may be more applicable; for 
other crimes, the second theory might be superior. The dispositional theory is more aptly 
applied to military crimes that are characterized by a consciousness of guilt not aligned 
with the beliefs or culture of the organization. This theory also better accounts for the 
 
21 Talbert and Wolfendale, War Crimes, 56. 
22 Harold Weltzer, “Mass Murder and Moral Code: Some Thoughts on an Easily Misunderstood 
Subject,” History of Human Sciences 17, no. 2 (2004): 15-32. 
23 Talbert and Wolfendale, War Crimes. 
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extensive array of reasons that civilian and military leaders have identified as the causes 
of war crimes, such as conditioned military compliance, racial and ethnic bigotry, 
ignorance of or lack of proper instruction on the rules24, and others.25 On the other hand, 
the situationist theory would be more applicable when the actor is not aware that they 
have committed an act outside of the bounds of legality because the action was within the 
norms of the culture and unit. In this case, the distal pressures of unit culture and 
expectations can better explain the committed or alleged crimes. 
 One area notably lacking in the literature, which will be further discussed in Part 
III of this literature review, is the differences between conventional and elite military 
units and the effects of those differences on military crimes. Special operations units are 
generally only included as examples in passing within the contexts of broader 
discussions, without specific consideration of the significant differences between special 
operations units and traditional military forces. It is to these important differences that 
that this study will turn next. 
Literature Review Part II: Special Operations Forces 
Literature Review Part IIa: “The SOF Process”: Specially Selected, Trained, and 
Educated  
 To understand why it is reasonable to expect SOF military crimes to differ from 
those of conventional forces, it is important to first understand how SOF personnel 
themselves differ from conventional military members. U.S. SOF personnel are specially 
selected, trained, and educated from the broader military force—a method summarized as 
 
24 Rules of engagement, or ROE, are military laws and orders outlining how force, including lethal force, 
can be used in warfare and against whom. They are boundaries set by the military authority in a given 
theatre and constrain how, when, in what way, and against whom military members can use force.  
25 Joanna Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing (Basic Books, 1999), 194. 
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the “SOF process”—to conduct the array of high-risk missions they are tasked with. 
These missions, known as special operations, are defined as “military activities 
conducted by specially designated, organized, trained, and equipped forces, manned with 
selected personnel, using unconventional tactics, techniques, and modes of 
employment.”26 This definition highlights why a higher degree of professionalism and 
expectation is expected of special operations personnel; nations have invested more 
money, time, and energy into their training and employment. In comparison to their 
conventional counterparts, they have received significantly more technical and tactical 
skills training, are more mature and experienced, and are considered to be among the 
most professional warfighters in the world.27  
SOF units conduct this rigorous “SOF process” because of the spectrum and 
gravity of the challenges that they are tasked with. These challenges include traditional 
military threats from large states, irregular challenges from terror groups and non-state 
actors, catastrophic risks such as the employment of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and 
disruptive challenges such as setting conditions for future military engagements.28 
Accomplishing these missions requires a more mature, agile, and adaptable force than the 
conventional military can offer. To prepare them for these varied and strategically 
important missions, the “SOF process” includes not only instruction on the tactical and 
 
26 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations,” NATO Standard 
Allied Joint Publication, December 13, 2013. 
27 Daniel Brown and Paul Szoldra, “Why Green Berets Are the Smartest, Most Lethal Fighters in the 
World,” Business Insider, April 15, 2015, https://www.businessinsider.com/green-berets-army-special-
forces-intelligent-well-trained-deadly-2013-3. 
28 Department of the Army. FM 3-05 Army Special Operations Forces. Department of Defense, 2006. 
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technical machinations of warfare but also extensive education in leadership, the laws 
surrounding armed conflict, and ethical decision making.29  
Although all steps of the process are important, it is the selection event that 
fundamentally shapes the organization as a whole. In the same way that a gardener 
improves his harvest by properly selecting the right seeds before he sows, the selection 
process creates a higher quality pool of personnel for the remaining portions of the “SOF 
process” to cultivate. The United States Army Special Operations Command rightfully 
boasts that it selects its personnel on attributes such as “intelligence, physical fitness, 
motivation, trustworthiness, accountability, maturity, stability, judgment…[emphasis 
added],”30 personal qualities that, if correctly selected for, can be expected to change the 
likelihood or nature of SOF military crimes compared to the broader military force. It is 
because of this unique selection, training, and education process that one can expect SOF 
personnel to commit military crimes under different circumstances than conventional 
forces. As is true in many areas of life, one should expect that superior experience, 
practice, repetition, and education will lead to superior, or at least different, results. 
Literature Review Part IIb: A Crisis Within SOF? 
 As noted in the introduction, despite the additional time, energy, and money 
invested in the “SOF process,” SOF personnel are not immune to military crimes by any 
means. A 2019 Comprehensive Report by the United States Special Operations 
 
29 Dick Couch, Chosen Soldier (New York, NY: Three Rivers Press, 2008); Jonathan Kinsley, “Special 
Forces Values: How the Regiment's Ethical Framework Influences Its Organizational Effectiveness,” The 
NPS Institutional Archive, 2017, 
https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/56744/17Dec_Kingsley_Jonathan.pdf?sequence=1&isAllo
wed=y. 
30 United States Army Special Operations Command, “Special Forces - Shooters and Thinkers,” Army 
Knowledge Online (Headquarters, U.S. Army, October 26, 2009), 
https://www.army.mil/article/29315/special_forces_shooters_and_thinkers. 
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Command (USSOCOM) is the best source of literature on the professional conduct and 
military crime issues plaguing U.S. special operators in recent years.31 The report was 
triggered by a string of high-profile breaches of ethical and legal conduct by the special 
operations community in the latter years of the 2010s. These military crimes weakened 
the prestige of the SOF organization and strained the U.S. public’s trust in the elite 
military community. In the review, USSOCOM identifies a few potential reasons for the 
recent failings within their organization. Most notably, the report finds that an 
overemphasis on lethal combat operations in the two-decade-long Global War on Terror 
has worked to the detriment of leadership, discipline, and ethical decision-making, 
eroding SOF culture.32  
Other potential reasons for the string of high-profile SOF military crimes are also 
related to the SOF obsession with “force employment.” This includes a deterioration of 
the force due to disregarding necessary ethical training, an increased sense of entitlement, 
and SOF units located increasingly farther from the military commanders meant to 
mentor and shape them.33 In summary, this report provides an important first step 
towards explaining why the nation’s most elite units may be experiencing a crisis of 
ethics and military crime. 
Literature Review Part III: Gaps in the Literature  
 A review of the literature reveals two gaps relevant to this research. The first gap 
explains shortcomings, or at least restrictive proclivities, in the existing science; the 
 
31 United States Special Operations Command, “Comprehensive Review,” USASOC, January 23, 2020, 
https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/6736-special-operations-forces-
review/c93cf96d67c341b2d2c3/optimized/full.pdf#page=1. 
32 John Ismay, “Elite U.S. Forces Critique Themselves: Overused, Underled, Raid-Obsessed,” The New 
York Times, January 29, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/29/us/eddie-gallagher-us-military-
special-forces.html. 
33 Ismay, “Elite U.S. Forces Critique Themselves.” 
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second is where this research places itself to contribute alongside the broader works on 
the subject. The first gap stems from the types of military crimes that are most researched 
and therefore available for review. It is mainly crimes on a grand strategic scale, such as 
the Holocaust, or that deal with visceral violence, like the infamous My Lai massacre of 
1968, that make up the research, in contrast to smaller, more personal, and less salacious 
crimes.34 
This is not without good reason. Certainly, larger crimes like the Holocaust or the 
genocide in Rwanda (another oft-cited event in the literature) have many more data 
points to gather and analyze. Scholars in this field suffer from the same shortcoming that 
every criminal researcher does—they can only research the crimes of those who have 
been caught or identified. Larger atrocities that involve more personnel are simply more 
likely to be discovered and therefore researched. 
It seems that the tendency to study acts of atrocious personal violence, compared 
to more mundane military crimes, is not due to the availability of data but rather to 
human nature. Crimes that shock the conscience and make for eye-catching headlines are 
simply more fascinating and, in turn, more likely to be read or purchased. Ultimately, 
these two factors leave a recognizable gap in the literature as a significant portion of 
military crimes probably does not exist on a large governmental scale or involve 
horrifying levels of violence. 
The second gap that this study seeks to address is a lack of research comparing 
the military crimes of elite units to those of the conventional military. A review of the 
literature reveals a plethora of data regarding what separates SOF from the rest of the 
 
34 Sara Mackmin, “Why Do Professional Soldiers Commit Acts of Personal Violence that Contravene the 
Law of Armed Conflict?,” Defence Studies 7, no. 1 (March 2007): 65-89. 
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military such as the “SOF process,” superior experience, and expertise. However, very 
little research exists contrasting criminal activities within the two organizations. Here, 
many readers will rightfully wonder whether SOF personnel commit military crimes at 
the same rate as the conventional military. Although the author shares this curiosity, it is 
not the focus of this research due to practical limitations in the data. Because of the 
classified nature of special operations organizations, as well as the nature of modern U.S. 
military strategy, such a quantitative study is unfortunately not possible at this time. It is 
simply not possible to know how many special operations personnel are deployed around 
the globe at any given time in order to quantitatively compare their crime rates with those 
of the conventional force.  
Literature Review Conclusions  
The available literature on military crime and SOF provides two theories that seek 
to explain military crime and the differences between SOF and conventional forces. 
Military crime, like war itself, is deeply complicated and riddled with both a lack of 
clarity and unknowns that render the situationist and dispositional theories each viable in 
certain circumstances. The situationist theory places the primary blame on situational 
factors such as military culture, training, and combat. Situationist theorists contend that 
these forces have significantly greater effects on service members than is commonly 
understood. In contrast, dispositional theorists offer a competing theory that combines 
environmental stressors with one’s character, upbringing, and perception of abstract 
concepts to explain military crime.  
 The other variable in this research—the differences between SOF and 
conventional units—is, on the surface, less complicated but ultimately under researched. 
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SOF personnel are uniquely selected, trained, and educated, and they are more mature 
and experienced than their conventional counterparts. However, current research does 
little to compare the military crimes of these two organizations; also, the literature suffers 
from an over emphasis on large-scale war crimes and brutal personal violence, both of 
which might make for more eye-catching headlines or subject matter. 
Methodology  
 This research primarily follows a grounded theory methodology as originally 
introduced by Glaser and Strauss in The Discovery of Grounded Theory in 1967.35 As 
described by Glaser, Strauss, and other key researchers,36 the data in this study are 
inductively analyzed to create meaning, and a theory is ultimately developed and 
grounded within these data.37 The substantive theory derived from this research seeks to 
first assess and describe whether the proximate causes of military crimes differ between 
the two organizations and, secondly, if and how the root causes differ. To properly 
understand the unique circumstances surrounding the U.S.’s Global War on Terror, the 
data are temporally scoped to U.S. military operations from 9/11 until January 2020.  
 Within this framework, the cumulative effects of the “SOF process”—the unique 
selection, training, and education process that SOF personnel undergo—and the SOF 
culture are treated as an independent variable, while the nature of military crimes serves 
as the dependent variable. These variables are used to assess whether undergoing the 
“SOF process,” as well as the effects of SOF culture, influence occurrences of or details 
 
35 Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative 
Research (Chicago: Routledge, 1999). 
36 Kathy Charmaz, Constructing Grounded Theory (London: Sage, 2014). 
37 Sharan Merriam and Elizabeth Tisdell, Qualitative Research: A Guide to Design Implementation, 4th ed. 
(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2016), 1. 
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surrounding military crimes. The null hypothesis in this framework would find no 
significant differences between the military crimes of SOF and conventional forces. 
However, as will be described in the following sections, the null hypothesis can be safely 
rejected. Rather, the data suggest an alternative hypothesis: that SOF military crimes vary 
significantly from those committed by the conventional military, both in terms of 
proximate cause and explanatory theory. 
The data collection method, sampling frame, and data analysis technique were 
specifically chosen to address the independent and dependent variables listed above. The 
data were primarily textual and collected from news articles, books, and other media 
reports about military crimes, as well as secondary sources containing key developments 
in the circumstances after the releases of news articles. A stratified purposeful sampling 
frame was used to ensure that the data covered the full spectrum of military crimes and 
not just those on a grand scale or involving atrocious violence, unlike the preponderance 
of previous research in the field. To that end, crimes of a relatively low intensity—such 
as financial theft—were selected along with more violent crimes for both SOF and 
conventional forces. The constant comparative method of data analysis was used to 
identify themes and similarities in the data, group like circumstances together, and 
analyze these relationships to create the grounded theory and framework that is the result 
of this research. These steps are outlined in the following section. 
Data and Discussion 
Introduction 
 The data and discussion sections of this research will follow in five parts. First, 
the data collection, data analysis, and analytical processes that led to the conclusions in 
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the discussion are further explained. Second, the conventional forces’ framework and 
proximate causes are presented. Third, the framework and proximate causes for SOF are 
explained. Fourth, the four proximate causes for conventional forces are compared to 
those of SOF and shown to be significantly different. Finally, the substantive theory that 
is the capstone of this research is presented. 
Data: Coding and Analysis Techniques 
 The data come from textual sources, primarily news articles, but also books and 
other media publications with significant findings regarding military crimes. These 
sources were chosen because they provide the most holistic view of the subject matter to 
include first-person accounts of the crimes, interviews, results and testimony from 
criminal trials, and the words and thoughts of others surrounding the crimes to better 
illuminate the events. 
 It is necessary to acknowledge two potential shortcomings in the data. First, as 
with any criminal study, it is only possible to analyze crimes that have been discovered. It 
is possible that themes hidden in successful (and therefore undiscovered) crimes 
confound the data and analysis. Second, it is also possible that the inherent classified 
nature and secretive culture of SOF organizations either result in underreporting of 
military crimes or obscure their true nature. Although these shortcomings may have some 
merit, their protest is one of “what if”; that is, they indicate a problem but offer no real 
solution. In the end, analyzing the data available provides far greater benefit than not 
doing so simply because some potentially unknown data cannot be obtained. 
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 A thorough inquiry of unclassified and open sources provided a total of 19 usable 
cases38 involving conventional forces and 15 usable cases39 involving SOF. These 34 
total cases were open coded for various details and related factors surrounding military 
crime such as “alcohol or drug use,” “unclear rules of engagement,” “rape or sexual 
violence,” and “personal greed.” This type of coding involves not only simple 
interpretations of data, such as “were there multiple actors or were there not,” but also 
allows for nuanced interpretations of tone, deeper meaning, and theme. As an illustrative 
example of the coding process, consider the following passages from The Kill Company, 
a 2009 article in The New Yorker that centers on military crimes involving the 
conventional soldiers of Colonel Michael Steele’s 101st Airborne brigade: 
I. “We give the enemy the maximum opportunity to give his life for his 
country.”40 The motto of the brigade while deployed and embodied by 
Colonel Steele. 
 
II. “A number of soldiers, among them General Peter Chiarelli, the Army’s 
Vice-Chief of Staff, believe that Steele set the conditions for a massacre 
by cultivating reckless aggressiveness in his soldiers, and by interpreting 




III. “‘We were not doing Arab cultural awareness,’ the senior officer recalled. 
‘We were not doing Arabic-with-Iraqi-dialect language training.’ Instead, 
Steele instituted a harsh regimen of physical conditioning…and incessant 
practicing at the rifle range.”42 
 
These quotes illuminate a few facts surrounding the crimes committed by the soldiers in 
the unit. First, they establish the clear emphasis on aggression (the brigade motto and 
 
38 See Figure 3 on page 37 for a summary of these cases and their proximate causes. 
39 See Figure 4 on page 38 for a summary of these cases and their proximate causes. 
40 Raffi Khatchadourian, “The Kill Company,” The New Yorker (July 6 & 13, 2009): 
2. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/07/06/the-kill-company. 
41 Khatchadourian, “The Kill Company,” 3. 
42 Khatchadourian, “The Kill Company,” 6. 
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focus on fitness and marksmanship) over cultural understanding (the lack of culture and 
language training). They also identify issues with superiors in the chain of command 
(General Chiarelli’s comments) and the lack of clarity surrounding the ROE that played 
center stage in the crimes committed by the unit.  
 These materials and codes were then analyzed to derive both a proximate cause 
and shared characteristics for each of the 34 cases; cases were grouped together based on 
similar circumstances and assessed for relationships. Finally, a selective coding process 
was used to turn these conceptually-linked segments of data into the formal framework 

















Discussion Ia: Conventional Force Framework 











-Violent crimes unrelated to or not occurring during combat
-Perpetrators are cognizant that they are committing a crime
-Most likely of all categories to involve alcohol and/or drug use
-High presence of racism/dehumanization of the enemy
-High stress due to recent deaths of peers
-Immaturity or inexperience of perpetrators




-Violent acts likely during combat
-Perpetrators often not cognizant or certain whether they have 
committed a crime
-Unclear rules of engagement from senior leaders
-Not likely related to alcohol or drug use
-High stress due to recent deaths of peers
-Cover up likely
-Both officer and enlisted personnel
-Less likely to involve the taking of war trophies or desecration
Personal Greed 3
-Special access to financial assets
-Belief that theft was “too easy”
-Belief that they could not be caught




-Large-scale disregard for human rights
-Likely to involve multiple actors or entire units
-Lack of accountability
-Lack of proper training
-High levels of immaturity or inexperience in perpetrators
-Likely to involve rape or sexual assault
-Affects officer and enlisted personnel
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Discussion Part Ib: Conventional Forces Proximate Causes 
The data on conventional forces’ military crimes reveal four broad proximate causes that 
are best explained by the dispositional theory. This theory explains these crimes because 
they tend to be characterized by the personality and/or criminal decisions of the 
individual in rebuke of cultural norms (Violent Desire Unrelated to Combat) or the 
aggressive leadership style of a senior leader that obscures the ROE for their subordinates 
(Over Aggression Related to Combat). For the purpose of this research, the proximate 
cause is defined as the factor or group of factors closest to or most responsible for 
causing the military crime(s) considered. It is often helpful to use the “but for” test to 
help in determining proximate cause. For example, in the conventional force case of 
Captain Michael Nguyen, who was convicted of stealing nearly $700,000 from U.S. 
contracts while deployed to Iraq, one can easily conclude that “but for” the personal 
greed of Captain Nguyen, the crime would not have occurred.43 The four categories of 
proximate causes for conventional forces are as follow: 
1. Violent Desire Unrelated to Combat: violent military crimes that are 
generally unrelated to or not committed during combat operations. That is, 
they are not decisions made “in the heat of the moment” (in direct engagement 
or combat with the enemy, where physiological arousal is occurring and 
higher-level judgment is inhibited); rather, they are premeditated actions by a 
perpetrator who is cognizant of the fact that they are committing a crime. 
These crimes include premeditated murder, mass murder, rape, and assault, 
 
43 U.S. Attorney's Office, “Army Officer Sentenced to 30 Months in Federal Prison After Admitting Theft 
of Government Property Related to DoD Contracts in Support of Iraq War Army Captain Stole in Excess of 
$690,000,” FBI - Portland Division (May 3, 2010), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/portland/press-
releases/2010/pd050310.htm. 
 25 
and they are often characterized by stress related to recent deaths of friendly 
personnel, the taking of war trophies or desecration of bodies, and illegal use 
of drugs or alcohol. They are usually committed by inexperienced and/or 
immature personnel. They are nearly universally considered criminal acts. 
2. Over Aggression Related to Combat: violent military acts and crimes that 
are directly related to combat operations; that is, actions occurring “in the heat 
of the moment.” Due to a number of factors, primarily aggressive culture 
established by leaders and vague or unclear ROE, these service members are 
often unaware or uncertain of whether they did, in fact, commit a crime. Their 
crimes are more closely related to the proper conduct of military operations as 
opposed to those in the preceding category. There are often differing views or 
interpretations of the criminality of these acts. 
3. Personal Greed: financial military crimes that involve either the theft of 
money or property or an illegal act with an intent to profit. These are 
characterized by special access to government or foreign funds. 
4. Systemic Disregard for Human Rights: large-scale abuses conducted by 
multiple actors or entire units, characterized by a disregard for human rights 
and the proper conduct of prison and interrogation operations at the beginning 
of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. They involve a lack of accountability, 
lack of proper training for the activities a unit is tasked with, lack of oversight, 




Discussion Part Ic: Conventional Forces Framework Analysis – War Crimes and 
Crimes as a Result of War 
 The most salient of these proximate cause categories can be viewed as War 
Crimes and Crimes as a Result of War, both of which are best explained through a 
dispositional lens. The War Crimes category, encompassing “Violent Desire Unrelated to 
Combat” and “Systemic Disregard for Human Rights,” most closely fits the traditional 
understanding of war crimes because such crimes are in clear violation of the LOAC. The 
perpetrator knows they are committing a crime and is likely actively involved in the 
cover up of the offense; these crimes do not skirt the boundaries of ethical military 
conduct. Rather, they are widely considered heinous. The archetypal case in this category 
is the Mahmudiyah rape, mass murder, and desecration described in the book 
Blackhearts: One Platoon’s Descent into Madness in Iraq’s Triangle of Death.44 In this 
case, the perpetrators are aware that their actions are, quite excessively, in violation of the 
LOAC and in no way related to legitimate military operations; they are active in the 
cover up of the offense, and their actions violate the norms of their unit, the military, and 
broader Western society. This case, like all cases of military crime, is not a simple affair 
to unravel, and its secondary and tertiary causes are numerous; however, one can be 
certain that “but for” the personal and violent dispositions of the perpetrators, the crimes 
would not have occurred. In this way, such crimes—and the proactive actions needed to 
mitigate them in the future—are best understood through the dispositional lens. 
 In contrast, the second category includes military crimes with an “Over 
Aggression Related to Combat” proximate cause and can be thought of as Crimes as a 
 
44 Jim Frederick, Black Hearts: One Platoon's Descent into Madness in Iraq's Triangle of Death (New 
York City: Random House, 2010). 
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Result of War. Although these events may in fact be crimes by a certain interpretation of 
the LOAC, they are not conducted with malicious intent and straddle the often vague 
boundary between the violence in warfare that is government-sanctioned and that which 
is not. The actions of Colonel Steele’s conventional brigade in Iraq, as illustrated in the 
New Yorker article The Kill Company, form what is perhaps the prototypical case in this 
category.45 The military crimes committed by the brigade are directly related to a 
legitimate military operation, the ROE are obscured by the aggressive personality of their 
commander, and the personnel involved are uncertain whether their actions are indeed 
military crimes or, conversely, if they are properly executing their commander’s intent 
and the mission’s requirements. Thus, if these actions are military crimes, they have more 
to do with the nature of warfare than the criminal predilections of the perpetrators. 
Nevertheless, they are best explained by the dispositional theory; it is the overly 
aggressive personality of a single actor or small group of actors—as opposed to distal 
pressures such as unit culture or military training—that obscures the battlefield and 
impedes the clarity needed by service members to make the difficult ethical decisions 








45 Khatchadourian, “The Kill Company.” 
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Discussion Part IIa: SOF Framework 
Figure 2: SOF Framework 
Discussion Part IIb: SOF Proximate Causes 
The proximate causes for SOF military crimes fall into three categories: 
1. Pushing Boundaries: violent military acts and crimes occurring during or as 
a direct result of legitimate combat operations, primarily characterized by the 
SOF culture prioritizing force employment and the bending of the ROE, at 
times to an extreme. These events are the most ambiguous of all the categories 
studied; they are often obscured by cover ups or protected by SOF culture. It 






-Questionable or accidental kills likely during combat but 
within SOF cultural norms
-Highly related to unit or SOF culture
-High incidence of bending or pushing ROE to the limits
-Involve greater unknowns than conventional force crimes
-High likelihood of cover up





-Violent acts or kills outside of SOF cultural norms and/or ROE
-Likely to involve personal difference from SOF 
culture/accepted behavior
-Perpetrators are often cognizant that they are committing a 
crime
Personal Greed 3
-Special access to financial assets
-Belief that theft was “too easy”
-Likely to occur both in and out of war zones due to nature of 
SOF activities
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vary significantly. Nevertheless, they are usually in pursuit of a legitimate 
military end state. This proximate cause category is similar to the 
conventional force category of “Over Aggression Related to Combat” in many 
ways; however, there are two key differences. First, the SOF “Pushing 
Boundaries” crimes tend to be in line with the unit culture and the 
expectations of leaders and the conventional force “Over Aggression Related 
to Combat” cases tend not to. This causes the potential military crimes to be 
viewed very differently in any subsequent investigation or inquiry. Second, 
the SOF “Pushing Boundaries” cases are not typified by a lack of 
understanding or clarity about the ROE like the “Over Aggression Related to 
Combat” cases. Rather, the SOF cases are committed with confidence and 
understanding of the ROE even as they are pushed to their limits. 
2. Excessive Individual Action: violent crimes that occur clearly outside of the 
established ROE and/or cultural norms of SOF. They are committed by an 
individual actor and are often looked down upon by the SOF community at 
large. Perpetrators are often cognizant that they are committing a crime, and 
interpretations of the event do not vary greatly. 
3. Personal Greed: financial military crimes that involve either the theft of 
government money or property or an illegal act with an intent to profit. These 
are characterized by special access to government or local funds. Due to the 
nature of SOF operations, these acts occur both within and outside of war 
zones. 
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Discussion Part III: Framework Comparison – Different Organizations, Different 
Military Crimes 
 A comparison of these two frameworks shows significant differences between 
SOF and conventional forces’ crimes. Broadly, conventional forces’ crimes align better 
with the dispositional theory, while SOF crimes align best with the situationist theory, as 
discussed in the literature review. Conventional forces’ crimes, heavily influenced by 
personal decisions to commit violence and often involving awareness that the acts are 
criminal, fit the theory posited by dispositional authors; this suggests that the 
conventional military is either unable to screen for this criminal predilection in a service 
member’s personality or unable to prevent such acts during wartime. In contrast, SOF 
crimes are heavily related to pushing the boundaries of a legitimate military mission and 
are influenced more by SOF culture than by an individual’s criminal disposition or an 
overly aggressive leadership personality. These crimes fit the situationist model and 
suggest that SOF culture, which is overly focused on combat operations (to the detriment 
of the force as a whole), has a greater effect on the SOF community than is commonly 
recognized.  
 Notably, in one particular area, the two organizations seem afflicted by the same 
condition: personal greed. Despite the “SOF process,” which is seemingly effective in 
limiting atrocities and producing experienced warfighters, SOF personnel do not seem 
demonstrably more inoculated against financial military crimes. The explanation for this 
problem is again, in all likelihood, the combat-focused culture of SOF. The over 
emphasis on force employment has reduced the ability of the SOF enterprise to protect 
itself from financial crimes; this has likely occurred by removing the leadership structures 
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from organizations, eroding team cohesion and bonds, and prioritizing mission 
accomplishment over training on leadership and ethics that could protect the force from 
such crimes. These findings support the work described in the 2019 Comprehensive 
Report by USSOCOM suggesting that an over emphasis on combat operations in the 
Global War on Terror has eroded the leadership architecture and ethical decision making 
within SOF. By pushing itself as hard and as fast as possible and becoming a results-
oriented (as opposed to a values-oriented) organization, SOF leadership has likely 
ignored—or at least under emphasized—proper training and education to prevent military 
financial crimes.  
 The final conventional forces’ proximate cause, Systemic Disregard for Human 
Rights, was due in large part to the culture of the U.S. government and military at the 
beginnings of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; this is less applicable to the current SOF 
enterprise, at least for now. These crimes, made famous at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq 
during the early years of the wars, consisted of mental, physical, and sexual assault and 
torture at detention facilities. The proximate cause of these crimes is twofold. First, the 
U.S. military was relatively inexperienced in the actual conduct of warfare after the 
relative peace following the end of the Cold War and first Gulf War. Second, and perhaps 
more importantly, a systemic culture encouraged and allowed crimes like these to occur, 
from the strategic to the tactical level. In short, the U.S. was hurt and “out for blood” and, 
in pursuit of this goal, eschewed proper restraint and conduct in detention operations. For 
better or worse, two decades of continuous combat have culled both the inexperience of 
the military and the post-9/11 lust for revenge, rendering this category less applicable to 
current U.S. military operations. However, if such an emotionally significant attack on 
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the U.S. homeland or people should happen again, the lessons should be revisited, lest the 
U.S. fall victim to the criminal sins of her past.  
Discussion V: SOF vs Conventional Forces Crimes: A Theory 
 Ultimately, this research finds that the military crimes of U.S. SOF differ 
significantly from those of the conventional U.S. military in terms of 1) the proximate 
causes of the individual crimes themselves and 2) the theoretical model that best explains 
their root causes. As evidenced in the preceding sections, the proximate causes for 
conventional forces’ crimes are Violent Desire Unrelated to Combat, Over Aggression 
Related to Combat, Personal Greed, and Systemic Disregard for Human Rights. In 
contrast, the proximate causes of SOF military crimes are Pushing Boundaries, Excessive 
Individual Action, and Personal Greed. These differences in proximate causes suggest 
that the underlying root causes of the two organizations’ military crimes differ as well. 
Conventional forces’ crimes tend to be dispositional in nature, while SOF military crimes 
are better explained by the situationist theory. These differences between the two 
organizations are explained by two variables: the “SOF Process” and SOF culture.  
 The “SOF Process” works to protect the SOF organization from dispositional 
crimes. These crimes, where the personality of the individual is more at play than 
situational factors, are mitigated by SOF selection, training, education, and experience, 
which create a force of personnel less likely to act against cultural norms. First, the 
exclusive selection process ensures that SOF personnel are trustworthy, intelligent, and 
dependable.46 In this way, the selection process molds an organization from the ground 
 





up that is less predisposed to the types of atrocious crimes seen widely in the 
conventional force, where personnel have not been specially selected for these traits.  
 Second, SOF personnel receive superior training and more education than 
conventional forces. The typical SOF member has “cultural and language training (most 
are masters of cross-cultural communication); has attended numerous advanced-skills 
schools; and has at least some college education, if not multiple degrees (this includes the 
enlisted ranks).”47 This additional training and education serves to directly reduce 
dispositional risk factors such as racism, dehumanization of the enemy, lack of 
understanding of the ROE, and immaturity.  
 Third, SOF personnel are significantly more mature and experienced than 
conventional force personnel. The average SOF member has served in the conventional 
force for eight years before even attending SOF selection.48 The SOF organization as a 
whole is “experienced and well-trained. The youngest personnel in SOF enter with 
extensive [conventional] experience, while the more mature members have, in some 
cases, been deployed in combat nearly constantly for more than a decade. It is possible 
that SOF are the most combat-experienced command in U.S. history.”49 This experience 
reduces the likelihood that one will emotionally overreact in combat or misinterpret the 
intent of a commander or the ROE, circumstances that are commonly involved in 
conventional forces’ military crimes. However, although this extensive combat 
experience does well to protect the organization from dispositional crime, it has 
contributed to a culture that leaves SOF with misaligned values. 
 
47 United States Special Operations Command, U.S. Special Operations Command Fact Book 2013, p. 55, 
http://www.socom.mil/News/Documents/USSOCOM_Fact_Book_2013.pdf. 
48 Bucci, “The Importance of Special Operations Forces Today.”  
49 Bucci, “The Importance of Special Operations Forces Today.” 
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 The erosion of SOF culture during the Global War on Terror has led to a 
disordered value system and leaves the organization vulnerable to situationist military 
crimes. SOF personnel, raised and surrounded by this disordered culture, are more likely 
to commit situationist military crimes that test or exceed the bounds of legality but are 
still within these misaligned SOF cultural norms. This disordered system places force 
employment—or lethal combat operations—on a pedestal at the expense of leadership, 
discipline, and ethical decision-making. SOF commands have regularly separated units 
from their leaders, neglected mentorship programs, and over incentivized service during 
combat; these shift the culture away from leader development and accountability and 
towards force employment as a nearly singular goal.50 In this way, SOF leadership has 
cultivated a culture that values combat without the necessary leadership and ethical 
mentorship to ensure that operations are conducted properly and in alignment with laws 
and norms. 
 Additionally, this system of imbalanced values begins even before SOF personnel 
begin their special operations careers. USSOCOM found that at SOF initial entry 
training, where soldiers begin their SOF experience, there is an “overemphasis on 
physical training which often comes at the expense of Service-specific professional 
development and acculturation.”51 This early cultural misalignment is perhaps the most 
damaging, as it is likely to affect the organization for years or even decades. As these 
young personnel advance through the ranks to positions of senior leadership, they set and 
influence the unit culture that has contributed to situationist crimes. 
 
 
50 USSOCOM, “Comprehensive Review,” 33. 
51 USSOCOM, “Comprehensive Review,” 42. 
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Significance of the Findings: Long-Term and Short-Term Risk Mitigation 
 These findings are significant in both the long and short terms as a means to 
mitigate the various risks associated with military crime. For U.S. military decision 
makers, the results are useful in the long term because they provide insights into how to 
mitigate future risks. They are also valuable in the short term for present-day military 
leaders as a tool to reduce the acute likelihood of military crimes taking place within their 
commands.  
 In the long term, conventional and SOF military decision makers need to be 
informed of such ethical shortcomings during their initial entry and training programs in 
order to produce a force that is less likely to commit military crimes. Those in charge of 
the conventional military training process should look to improve the assessment of 
individual personalities of those entering the service, as well as the training on ethical 
decision making provided during initial entry training. In a twenty-century battlefield 
where an atrocious war crime can be the most strategically significant act committed by 
an entire brigade, potentially outweighing the otherwise successful hard work of 
thousands, screening for and protection against dispositional military crimes cannot be 
neglected, and it cannot simply be taught in passing or “on the job.” 
 The SOF leadership community needs to do two things to reduce their risk 
associated with military crimes. First, they need to capitalize on the success of the “SOF 
process” and continue the selection, education, and training that have shown success in 
protecting the organization from dispositional crimes. Second, they need to cultivate a 
culture that, although tasked with dangerous and strategically significant operations, does 
not neglect leadership training or the importance of operations other than combat; this 
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culture must remain mission-focused within the legal boundaries provided by the U.S. 
government. In this way, SOF leaders need to bring the culture of the organization back 
into alignment with its values and mission.  
 In the short term, these findings provide military leaders of all levels with a list of 
warnings and risk circumstances that make their formations susceptible to military 
crimes. By understanding what events and risk factors leave a unit vulnerable to various 
criminal acts, a leader can act to mitigate those risks. For example, a conventional force 
commander whose unit has recently experienced friendly causalities and had issues with 
drug and alcohol abuse overseas may take the opportunity to embrace a more supportive 
and understanding command climate, rather than one over emphasizing aggression at the 
expense of individual service members’ emotional health and ability to understand 
complex ROE. A SOF commander, knowing that they will have a small number of 
personnel with special access to government funds that might tempt personal greed, may 
opt to prioritize training in ethical financial decision-making, or perhaps a vignette 
illustrating the criminal repercussions of theft, in lieu of one extra combat training event.  
 To be clear, the author strongly and whole-heartedly agrees that the combat 
readiness of any military formation is paramount, and this research does not suggest 
otherwise. The ability of service members to successfully shoot, move, and communicate 
in combat cannot and should not compromised. Nevertheless, this fact should not be used 
to eschew necessary training or education in other areas that support the holistic health of 
the organization. Put simply, combat operations may be the most important thing a unit is 




 Presented with a modern military battlefield that is confounded by a 1,000+ page 
Law of War manual, as well as ROE that can change at a moment’s notice, Cicero may be 
tempted to amend his original quote—“in times of war, the law falls silent”—to read “in 
times of war, the law gets murky.” The paradox of legally and ethically bound warfare 
that inherently sanctions mass murder makes the questions surrounding military crimes 
harder to define and answer than those surrounding civilian crimes. The literature 
surrounding military crimes seeks to answer fundamental questions about the psychology 
of these events, but it does not sufficiently cover the differences between elite and 
conventional military units. Furthermore, it suffers from an over emphasis on large-scale 
and atrocious crimes. To help fill this gap, this research compares the military crimes of 
U.S. SOF with those seen in the conventional U.S. military and finds that their proximate 
causes and underlying explanatory theories differ significantly. This is likely due to the 
nature of the “SOF process” and SOF culture which, when viewed together, protect U.S. 
SOF from heinous dispositional military crimes but also leave the organization more 
susceptible to military crimes influenced by excessive focus on force employment. 
 Further research in this area may look to study the ethical and legal educations 
during initial military entry training and the SOF training pipelines to see if they align 
with the proximate causes and risk circumstances identified within this study. This can 
then be used to adjust the training of personnel and thereby lower the risk of the “self-
inflicted spoiling attacks” that military crimes can create. More immediately, military 
commanders should use the findings in this research to identify when and in what ways 
the organization is at risk of military crimes, using their knowledge of their formation and 
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their command authority to make risk-reductive changes. It is ultimately, of course, 
impossible to entirely eliminate crimes among U.S. service members abroad, just as it is 
impossible to eliminate crime in any sufficiently large population. However, by better 
understanding the proximate causes and underlying theories that explain military crimes, 
it is possible to reduce the dangers they pose to the victims, the prestige of the U.S. 







Figure 3: List of Conventional Force Military Crimes Cases 
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